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Variation on Libel Per Quod
Laurence H. Eldredge*
During the nineteenth century it became settled common law in
England and in the United States that in any action for libel, as distinct
from slander, the plaintiff could recover damages without pleading or
proving that he had in fact suffered any damages as a result of the
publication. The American Law Institute accepted this as sound law.
Volume III of the Restatement of Torts, published in 1938, stated the
rule in section 569: "One who falsely, and without a privilege to do so,
publishes matter defamatory to another in such a manner as to make
the publication a libel is liable to the other although no special harm or
loss of reputation results therefrom."
In 1941, in the first edition of his excellent treatise on the law of
torts, Dean Prosser stated: "This is the accepted rule in England, and
in the great majority of the American jurisdictions, not only as to publi-
cations which are defamatory upon their face, but also as to those which
require resort to extrinsic facts by way of 'inducement' to establish the
defamatory meaning." 1
Some states, however, had adopted the spurious rule of "libel per
quod," which states that when the written statement is innocent on its
face and only becomes defamatory in the light of extrinsic facts, the
defendant is not subject to liability unless the plaintiff pleads and proves
special damages.2 Without considering the soundness of the "libel per
quod" rule, New Mexico joined this group of states in 1949 in the case
of Chase v. New Mexico Publishing Co., because "the parties are in
accord that the complaint is insufficient unless the publication is libelous
per se, no actual or special damages having been alleged. ' 3
In 1970 New Mexico, in Reed v. Melnick, rejected the libel per
quod rule, modified its holding in Chase and the cases that followed it,
and held that "the better rule, which we hereby adopt" is the rule of
section 569 of the Restatement with this addition: "provided, however,
that where the defamatory character of the writing can only be shown
* Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law; Adviser and former Revising Reporter on
Torts for The American Law Institute. B.S. 1924, Litt.D. 1970, Lafayette College; J.D. 927,
University of Pennsylvania.
I. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 797 (Ist ed. 1941) (footnotes omitted).
2. Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REV. 839 (1960); Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel
Per Quod. 79 HARV. L. REV. 733 (1966).
3. Chase v. New Mexico Pub. Co., 53 N.M. 145, 147-48,203 P.2d 594, 595 (1949).
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by reference to extrinsic facts the plaintiff must plead and prove either:
(1) that the publisher knew or should have known of the extrinsic facts
which were necessary to make the statement defamatory in its innuendo;
or (2) special damages."
'4
So far as the case law is concerned, this decision announces a rule
of law never before stated by any appellate court in the United States.
Mr. Justice Watson said: "Thus we adopt § 569 of the Restatement of
Torts, together with what we understand to be the intended meaning of
the amendment adopted at the 1966 meeting of the American Law Insti-
tute."
5
The amendment referred to was to my motion "that the Institute
retain the present section 569 and its comments; that it reject the pro-
posed substitute and the proposed new comments, with the understand-
ing that the present comments may be expanded to reflect recent deve-
lopments in the law."' The amendment to this motion was offered by
Dean John Wade, a member of the Council of The American Law
Institute and an Adviser on Torts to the Reporter and to the Council,
and it read as follows: "I would like to suggest an amendment to Mr.
Eldredge's motion to the effect that the old section 569 be retained with
the addition at the end of it of a clause reading like this: 'unless he knew
or should have known of the extrinsic facts which were necessary to
make the statement defamatory in its innuendo.' "7 Dean Wade's mot-
ion to amend was seconded by Judge Breitel of New York, and after
considerable debate was carried by a vote of 69 to 58.8 The meeting then
recessed for lunch.
This vote changed section 569 to provide that the publisher of an
unprivileged libel "is liable to the other although no special harm or loss
of reputation results therefrom unless he knew or should have known of
the extrinsic facts which were necessary to make the statement defama-
tory in its innuendo." This does not make sense, but it is what 69
members of the august American Law Institute voted for. I submit that
this language relieves the publisher of liability when he knew the inno-
cent-on-its-face statement was defamatory. That is not what Dean Wade
or Judge Breitel intended.
4. Reedy. Melnick, 81 N.M. 608,610,471 P.2d 178, 180(1970).
5. Id.
6. A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 434 (1966). The proposed substitute was presented by the Reporter,
Dean Prosser, in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).
7. A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 448 (1966).
8. Id. at 460.
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I believe that they intended to amend section 569 to read:
(1) Except as stated in subsection 2,
One who falsely, and without a privilege to do so, publishes matter
defamatory of another in such a manner as to make the publication
a libel is liable to the other although no special harm or loss of
reputation results therefrom.
(2) Where the defamatory character of the libel can only be shown
by reference to extrinsic facts the publisher is not liable unless he
knew or should have known these extrinsic facts.
Their thought was that when the statement was innocent on its face9 and
the publisher neither knew nor should have known of the extrinsic facts
that gave the words their defamatory sting,10 he should not be liable. But
the language of the amendment does not so provide, and it does not state
what happens to the completely innocent publisher of a libel when the
plaintiff pleads and proves special damages. The completely innocent
slanderer is liable in such a case." The 1970 decision in Reed v. MelnickV
2
holds the innocent publisher of libel liable when he causes special dam-
ages. That appears to be sound, but it is difficult to find it to be the
"intended meaning of the [Wade] amendment." No such intent can be
derived from the words of the amendment.
When the Institute reconvened after the luncheon recess, President
Darrell ruled that The American Law Institute had "voted to retain the
present black letter section with the language added to it which Dean
Wade spoke of this morning."13 This had been only a tentative vote,
however, and during the luncheon recess Dean Prosser as Reporter,
Dean Wade, and some other Advisers had reviewed the amendment and
decided that it could not be accepted, even as intended by Dean Wade.
Dean Prosser said, "I think the Reporter should attempt to draft an-
other section and bring it back next year." President Darrell ruled: "It
is quite clear that this will have to be brought back to the meeting next
year. If you [Mr. Eldredge] do not like the formulation, or anybody else
does not like the formulation that the Reporter comes in with pursuant
to the mandate to him, you will have every opportunity, and you can
marshal your forces for this purpose later to defeat the amendment and
move again for the unadulterated original section."' 4 The question was
9. E.g., Morrison v. Ritchie & Co. [1901-021 Sess. Cas. 645, 39 Scot. L.R. 432 (Scot. 2d
Div.) (classic case involving the birth announcement of twins).
10. In Morrison the parents had been married only one month.
11. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 575 (1938).
12. 81 N.M. 608, 471 P.2d 178 (1970).
13. A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 461-62 (1966).
14. Id. at 462,
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not brought back to the 1967 meeting, and final action is still in the
future. As this is written, section 569 as published in 1938 still stands.
The controversy that developed at the Institute's annual meeting
was initiated by Dean Prosser's proposed revision of section 569, which
says:
(1) One who publishes defamatory matter is subject to liability
without proof of special harm or loss of reputation if the defamation
is
(a) libel whose defamatory innuendo is apparent from the
publication itself without reference to extrinsic facts by way of
inducement, or
(b) libel or slander which imputes to another
(i) a criminal offense, as stated in § 571,
(ii) a loathsome disease, as stated in § 572,
(iii) matter incompatible with his business, trade, profes-
sion or office, as stated in § 573, or
(iv) unchastity on the part of a woman plaintiff, as stated
in § 574.
(2) One Who publishes any other defamation is subject to liability
only upon proof of special harm, as stated in § 575.
This proposed revised section 569 provides that when the defamatory
statement is innocent on its face the publisher is not liable "without
proof of special damages, in any case where it would not be so actionable
if it were slander."' '15 Dean Prosser cited nineteen cases in thirteen states,
including seven in New York, to support his position. 6 The American
case law on this point is in conflict. There is authority to support Dean
Prosser's position and also authority to support the original section 569,
but there was no authority in 1966 to support Dean Wade's amendment.
It was not a restatement of existing case law; it was pure legislation.
Judge Dimock of New York said: "I oppose the amendment, because I
think by adopting it we would be engaging in the dangerous process of
making law."' 7 Dean Prosser said: "If I were legislating, I should be
entirely in sympathy with Dean Wade's proposal."' 8 He added that if
he had, as Reporter, presented it "I think I should have been accused
by a great many people of taking a leap into the wild blue yonder
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569, Note to Institute at 29-30 (Tent. Draft No.
12, 1966).
16. Id. § 569, at 38-43. These cases are also cited and discussed in Prosser, More Libel Per
Quod, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1629, 1639-45 (1966).
17. A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 455 (1966).
18. Id. at 457.
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.... I could not as a Reporter have brought in something that just
isn't in the case law, but maybe he has put his finger on something that
I don't know."' 9
Dean Wade said: "I would certainly have no idea of trying to make
new law contrary to existing law. ' 20 He explained, "I would suggest that
if you take the time to look through the cases which have been collected
by Mr. Prosser, you will find that in the great majority of these cases,
though the Courts didn't talk about it, where the defendant was innocent
in the sense that he did not know about these intrinsic facts, then they
required the proof of actual damages, but where they thought the defen-
dant did know .... " they did not.2' In his seconding speech Judge
Breitel said
with the exception of the dictum by Judge Traynor, there are no cases that develop
a ratio decidendi that supports the view that [Dean Wade] expresses and that I now
second, but I think the Institute is faced with one of the most important problems
in this area. . . . the situation regarding the facts in almost all of the cases...
can be explained by a new rationale that has not been supplied by the courts. I
suggest that the Institute promotes its highest function when it does supply a ration-
ale that will explain the decisions in the courts, and will assist the courts in develop-
ing a better rationale than apparently they have been capable of doing up until the
present time."
I had studied thoroughly each one of the nineteen cases upon which
Dean Prosser relied, and I protested "we are going into the complete
blue sky to try to do what Dean Wade suggests." 3 I explained:
These cases that have been decided are generally decided on the pleadings. There is
the averment in the inducement-of extrinsic facts; and then in the innuendo they
set forth the defamatory meaning in the light of those extrinsic facts. When the
courts decide that the complaint does or does not state a cause of action without
allegation of special damages, they are not considering anything about whether
there was knowledge upon the part of the defendant or not of those extrinsic facts
24
After the 1966 meeting of The American Law Institute I restudied
each one of these nineteen cases, and it is clear to me that the facts
-pleaded or otherwise stated-as set forth in the appellate court
opinions in these cases do not support the "rationale" stated by Dean
Wade and Judge Breitel. Not even one of them supports it and the "great
majority" of them are flatly contrary to it because the plaintiff lost even
though the defendant knew or should have known the falsity of his
19. Id. at 458-59.
20. Id. at 457.
21. Id. at 448.
22. Id. at 449.
23. Id. at 451.
24. Id. at 450.
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statement. Let us look at each one of these nineteen cases to determine
the accuracy of the foregoing statement.
(1) Ilitzky v. Goodman,25 in Arizona: The plaintiff specifically
pleaded that the letter was part of a course of conduct which the defen-
dant maliciously pursued and "that the facts and the meaning of the
letters were known by the defendants at the time to be false.1 2 Nonethe-
less, the complaint was dismissed. 27 This case is contrary to the Wade
amendment because the absence of an allegation of special damages was
fatal despite the presence of an allegation that the defendants knew the
letter was false.
(2) McBride v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co.,2" a federal case
applying Florida law: The plaintiff sued a publishing company for an
alleged libelous magazine article naming him as the head of a gambling
establishment. The case was dismissed on the pleadings, and I can find
nothing in the opinion that sheds any light on whether the defendant
knew or should have known of the facts that made the statement defama-
tory. There certainly is nothing in the opinion that supports the Wade
amendment.
(3) Karrigan v. Valentine,29 in Kansas: The case was dismissed on
the complaint, which specifically pleaded that "said defendants, having
full knowledge and/or should have had full knowledge of the fact that
the plaintiff was not married . . . willfully and maliciously published ' 31
etc. Despite an allegation that clearly states a* cause of action under the
Wade amendment, the failure to plead special damages was held to be
fatal .31
(4) Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co.,3 in Kentucky:
The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer to the complaint that
the plaintiff had been libeled by the publication, which had said that
plaintiff paid lower than union wages and used scab advertising. The
appellate court upheld the trial court on this part of its decision. The
pleaded extrinsic facts concerning the plaintiff's relations and contracts
25. 57 Ariz. 216, 112 P.2d 860 (1941).
26. Id. at 220. 112 P.2d at 862.
27. The Supreme Court of Arizona found, however, that special damages were pleaded
sufficiently and reversed the lower court on that point.
28. 196 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1952).
29. 184 Kan. 783, 339 P.2d 52 (1959).
30. Id. at 786, 339 P.2d at 55.
31. The Supreme Court of Kansas found, however, that special damages were pleaded suffi-
ciently to state a cause of action for libel per quod and held that the demurrer was erroneously
sustained on that point.
32. 169 Ky. 64, 183 S.W. 269 (1916).
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with labor unions were readily ascertainable and should have been
known by the defendant. I do not find any support for Dean Wade in
this case.
(5) Campbell v. Post Publishing Co.,33 in Montana: The com-
plaint alleged that a news item concerning an event which did not take
place identified the plaintiff in such a way that friends would think she
had committed bigamy. The court said: "There being no allegation of
special damages, the complaint was insufficient to state a cause of ac-
tion.1 34 The opinion is silent on whether there were any allegations that
the defendants knew or should have known of the publication's falsity,
and I would conclude that the court thought this was quite immaterial.
I construe the case as not supporting the Wade amendment.
(6) Chase v. New Mexico Publishing Co.,35 in New Mexico: Here
the plaintiff complained of innuendo in an editorial. The plaintiff specifi-
cally pleaded that the defendant newspaper previously had published
articles accusing the plaintiff of misconduct and articles concerning the
misconduct of other persons named in the editorial. These are the extrin-
sic facts, and it is clear that they were completely known to the newspa-
per. Indeed, the plaintiffs complaint was that the defamatory sting
arose when the material that the defendant previously had published was
read with the editorial. Nonetheless, the complaint was dismissed for the
failure to allege special damages. I consider this case to be squarely
contrary to the Wade amendment.
(7) O'Connell v. Press Publishing Co.,36 in New York: Judgment
for the plaintiff was reversed on appeal. There is no reference to what
the plaintiff pleaded or did not plead, proved or did not prove, concern-
ing the defendant's knowledge of the extrinsic circumstances. In the
lower court, Judge Stapleton had ruled that the article was defamatory
on its face, saying that it "fairly charges him with an offense against
the statutes cited without the necessity of extrinsic averments. ' ' 37 I find
nothing in the opinion of Judge Collin in the Court of Appeals-and it
may be noted that Cardozo and Seabury were among the dissenters
-that offers any support to the Wade amendment.3 8
33. 94 Mont. 12. 20 P.2d 1063 (1933).
34. Id. at 18. 20 P.2d at 1064.
35. 53 N.M. 145. 203 P.2d 594 (1949).
36. 214 N.Y. 352. 108 N.E. 556 (1915).
37. O'Connell v. Press Pub. Co., 137 N.Y.S. 332. 337 (Sup. Ct. 1912).
38. Dean Prosser conceded at the 1966 meeting that the decision of the Court of Appeals on
May 5. 1966. in Hinsdale v. Orange County Publications. Inc.. 17 N.Y.2d 284. 217 N.E.2d 650,
270 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1966). overruled this case and the other New York cases he cited from lower
courts, A.L.I. PROCEEDI\Gs 432 (1966).
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(8) Kuhn v. Veloz, 0 in New York, Appellate Division: In this case
the article, procured by the defendant for publication, concerned "the
origin of gowns worn by the defendant Yolanda Veloz, a theatrical
performer. . . . The article states that defendants designed many of the
gowns described."4 It mentioned the plaintiff as "chief seamstress" for
the defendant. The plaintiff pleaded she designed all of the gowns. It is
obvious that the defendant did know the pleaded extrinsic facts that the
plaintiff "was a creator of gowns, specializing in theatrical costumes,
and widely known in that line as the designer of Yolanda Veloz's
gowns."' 41 Yet, the court ruled that the plaintiff must plead special dam-
ages and dismissed the complaint. This case is squarely contrary to the
Wade amendment.
(9) Solotaire v. Cowles Magazine, Inc.,42 in New York, Supreme
Court: One defendant wrote and the other published an article that
described the plaintiff's husband as a bachelor. The plaintiff pleaded
that "she and her husband married in 1929 and have one son, 21 years
of age," that "for the past 17 years, plaintiff, her husband and son
maintained a marital and family domicile in this County and were well
and favorably known," and that the statements describing her husband
as a bachelor were "recklessly made" to injure the plaintiff's reputa-
tion. 43 The averment that the statements were "recklessly made" is par-
ticularly important. It is perfectly obvious that the extrinsic facts con-
cerning marital status were readily available in the community. The
complaint, however, was dismissed. I submit that this case is squarely
contrary to the Wade amendment.
(10) Macri v. Mayer,44 in New York, Supreme Court: The court
dismissed an action for libel that alleged that the defendant had pub-
lished an article which mistakenly gave credit for plaintiff's advertising
slogan to one Mr. Williams. The report is completely silent on any
allegation concerning what the defendant knew or should have known.
I would think, however, that in advertising circles the authorship of a
"successful advertising slogan" important enough to be written up in
an article would be either well known or determinable upon a reasonable
investigation. This case appears to me to be contrary to the Wade
amendment; in any event, I do not see how it gives it any support.
39. 252 App. Div. 515, 299 N.Y.S. 924 (1937).
- 40. Id. at 516, 299 N.Y.S. at 925.
41. id.
42. 107 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
43. Id. at 799.
44. 22 Misc. 2d 429, 201 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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(11) Everett v. Gross,45 in New York, Appellate Division: The
defendant's article stated that the plaintiff threatened to see that certain
track stewards would lose their job if they upheld a foul claim against
the winning horse. The extrinsic facts pleaded in the complaint were that
"Mrs. Everett is the president, a director, and the majority stockholder
of the corporate plaintiff and the head of Arlington Park Jockey
Club,"" where the stewards operated. The appellate division reversed
the lower court's order denying a motion to dismiss. I suggest that in
horse racing circles these facts must have been widely known or readily
ascertainable. The individual, Milton Gross, who wrote the story for the
New York Post must have known who Mrs. Everett was, and that her
corporate positions were what made her alleged threats to the stewards
so serious. Nevertheless, the appellate division unanimously reversed the
lower court and dismissed the complaint. I construe this case as being
contrary to the Wade amendment.
(12) Legion Against Vivisection v. Grey,47 in New York, Supreme
Court: Neither the facts nor the pleadings are mentioned in the opinion.
The court set aside the 4,000 dollar verdict for the individual plaintiff
on the fifth cause of action for failure to prove special damages, and set
aside the nominal verdict for the corporate plaintiff on the second cause
of action for (I) failure to prove special damages, and (2) lack of corpor-
ate authority to prosecute the action. As the court did not mention
whether the defendant knew or should have known the extrinsic facts,
all I can conclude is that this was a matter of no importance on the
question of setting aside the verdicts. Even if this case isn't contrary to
the Wade amendment, it certainly does not give any support to it.
(13) Flake v. Greensboro News Co.," in North Carolina: I doubt
that this case is entitled to much weight in view of the fact that sixteen
years after Flake the Supreme Court of North Carolina cited section 569
with approval49 and in light of an excellent law review note that has
severely criticized the case.5 The facts in Flake were that the plaintiff
was a well-known entertainer who had broadcast over New York radio
station WABC. The Greensboro Daily News mistakenly had inserted a
45. 22 App. Div. 2d 257, 254 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1964).
46. Id. at 258, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
47. 63 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
48. 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).
49. Kindley v. Privette, 241 N.C. 140, 84 S.E.2d 660 (1954).
50. 33 N.C.L. Rev. 674 (1955).
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picture of her in a bathing suit into an advertisement for "Mlle. Salle
Payne" of the "Folies de Paree," which the plaintiff pleaded was a
sensual performance or sex parade. Greensboro presumably was the
plaintiff's family home because her mother sent the paper to her in New
York, and the plaintiff apparently was well known in North Carolina
because the paper promptly published a full explanation of the mistake
and an apology. The court said "[t]he record does not disclose just how
the mistake occurred or how the Greensboro News Company came into
possession of the plaintiffs photograph, whether the news company had
the photograph in its files in connection with plaintiffs campaign for
publicity, or it was furnished by Folies de Paree.151 The court held that
the failure to prove special damages required setting aside the 6,500
dollar verdict. There is no discussion of whether the defendant knew or
should have known that the photograph was that of the plaintiff rather
than that of Mlle. Payne. I would cohclude that the defendant was
careless and should have known. If that conclusion is correct, then the
case is contrary to the Wade amendment.
(14) Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Inc.,
52 in
North Dakota: In this case the plaintiff, a lawyer, complained about his
listing in the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, which rates lawyers
and represents their ratings by symbols that can only be understood by
using confidential keys. The court said "[t]he plaintiff claims to have
been damaged by reason of the publication of blanks after his name, and
in order to explain why such publication is defamatory he pleads ex-
cerpts from the [defendant's] confidential key, along with other mat-
ter. ' '53 The other matter, along with its own confidential key, were all
extrinsic facts that were clearly known to the defendant. The court,
however, reversed the lower court and dismissed the complaint. This
case is squarely contrary to the Wade amendment.
(15) Moore v. P. W. Publishing Co.,5 in Ohio: Dean Prosser con-
ceded that his case was decided incorrectly. The plaintiff was a 60-year-
old female Negro, long active in community affairs and Democratic
Party politics in Akron, Ohio. She complained that, after Governor
DiSalle had spoken before a group of Negro Democrats on March 6,
1962, the defendant newspaper ran the headline, "Angry DiSalle Calls
Akron Woman 'Uncle Tom'" and published the plaintiff's picture with
the article. The plaintiff testified that the phrase "'Uncle Tom' ... has
51. 212 N.C. at 783-84, 195 S.E. at 58.
52. 66 N.D. 578,268 N.W. 400 (1936).
53. Id. at 592-93, 268 N.W. at 408 (opinion on rehearing).
54. 3 Ohio St. 2d 183, 209 N.E.2d 412 (1965).
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an established meaning in ordinary usage today among the Negro popu-
lation generally as a person who will sell out his community, his race,
who will do things for himself rather than for his people. ' 5 There was
other testimony to the same effect. If these be considered "extrinsic
facts," they certainly are facts that would be known to the city editor
of the Cleveland Call and Post, which printed the headline. The jury
made a special finding that the name "'Uncle Tom' . . . imputed to
her [plaintiff] conduct that tends to harm her reputation and lower her
in the estimation of the community ... 56 and found a total verdict of
32,000 dollars which included 25,000 dollars punitive damages. The
Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground the headline was "libel per
se." The Supreme Court found that the newspaper references were not
libelous per se, and entered a judgment for the defendant newspaper. I
consider the case to be contrary to the Wade amendment.
(16) Hargrove v. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co.,5 7 Oklahoma:
Judgment on demurrer for the defendant was affirmed. The court said:
"We believe it would be stretching the rule of libel too far to say that a
false imputation that a man is a Negro is a libel upon his wife." 58 I do
not think this case stands for much of anything. Hargrove was a white
man and so was his wife. People who did not know them would assume
from the story-keep in mind this is Oklahoma in 1925-that Hargrove
and his wife were both Negroes. People who did know the Hargroves
would know that he was not a Negro and the story could not carry the
innuendo, then, that Mrs. Hargrove was married to a Negro. I think the
court just decided that there was no defamation at all of the plaintiff in
this case. Consequently, I think that the case does not shed any light,
one way or the other, on the Wade amendment.
(17) Fite v. Oklahoma Publishing Co.,59 in Oklahoma: In this case
there was no proof at all of extrinsic circumstances making the newspa-
per article defamatory. The court specifically said: "The article does not
charge that she attempted to lobby with certain senators in violation of
the law. . . .Many good citizens are lobbyists ... ."" The action was
dismissed because the plaintiff did not prove she had been defamed. The
case is not relevant to the present question.
(18) Fry v. McCord,"' in Tennessee: The plaintiff sued for libel
55. Id. at 189, 209 N.E.2d at 416.
56. Id. at 190,209 N.E.2d at 416.
57. 130 Okla. 76, 265 P. 635 (1928).
58. Id. at 79, 265 P. at 637.
59. 146 Okla. 150, 293 P. 1073 (1930).
60. Id. at 153, 293 P. at 1076.
61. 95 Tenn. 678, 33 S.W. 568 (1895).
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and received a 400 dollar verdict, although the facts bring the case within
the definition of injurious falsehood. The pleaded extrinsic facts were
statements prepared by the defendant himself, who therefore obviously
knew them. The Supreme Court, however, held it to have been error on
the part of the trial court to fail to sustain the defendant's demurrer.
This case is squarely contrary to the Wade amendment. Furthermore,
it is one of the worst decisions in the United States. The court was so
ignorant that the opinion writer said that the proposition that special
damages need not be alleged in cases of libel "is not sustained by any
authority whatever in the way of adjudicated cases." 2
(19) Electric Furnace Corp. v. Deering Milliken Research Corp.,6"
a federal case applying Tennessee law: With respect to the extrinsic
circumstances, the court said: "It is further contended by the plaintiff
that defendant knew of the representation of Electric Furnace that it
would not disclose the names of its customers; that it would hold them
in confidence; and that Deering Milliken sought to destroy this confi-
dence and the good will between Electric Furnace and its customers by
implying that Electric Furnace had voluntarily broken its promises. The
plaintiff claims. that the action of the defendant was knowingly and
maliciously done. "6 . ."4 In addition, the court referred to the clear
testimony that before the letter was sent, the defendant's president
showed it to the plaintiff's president who protested and "said that he had
told his customers that he would not divulge their names and that he had
built up good will with them which [defendant] sought to destroy by the
letter."" Nonetheless, the case was dismissed for the failure to prove
special damages. This case is squarely contrary to the Wade amendment.
This completes my review of the nineteen cases Dean Prosser relied
on primarily, but the case of Hinsdale v. Orange County Publications,
Inc., should be mentioned. In evaluating the May, 1966, decision by the
Court of Appeals of New York, " both Judge Breitel and Dean Wade
made much of the fact that the plaintiff pleaded that the defendant knew
or should have known of the extrinsic circumstances. The opinion of the
court, however, did not refer to this as a fact of any juridical importance.
In view of the way the opinion was written and what was emphasized, I
cannot see that this case can really be cited as support for the Wade
amendment.
62. Id. at 694, 33 S.W. at 572; see Eldredge, supra note 2, at 733 (my analysis of the case).
63. 325 F.2d 761 (6th Cir. 1963).
64. Id. at 763.
65. Id. at 764.
66. 17 N.Y.2d 284, 217 N.E.2d 650,270 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1966).
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In proposing his amendment Dean Wade said that he had "no idea
of trying to make new law." That statement, and the fact that he is now
the Institute's Reporter for Torts, leads me to hope that at the appropri-
ate time he will ask the Institute to repeal the Wade amendment and
approve section 569 as it appears in the First Restatement. With the
Wade amendment gone there would be no support whatever for the 1970
New Mexico decision in Reed v. Melnick. It is to be hoped that it will
not be followed, and that section 569 will be accepted without any
change. In August 1966 the present section received additional support
from the unusual decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon,
en banc, in the case of Hinkle v. Alexander.7 In its first opinion in this
case filed on March 9, 1966, the court affirmed the entry of a judgment
n.o.v. for the defendant in a libel case for failure to prove special
damages. A rehearing was allowed for the express purpose of having
the entire court consider and determine the question "should we
adhere to the common law rule in respect to defamation by libel
which is adopted as Restatement, 3 Torts, Ch. 24, Section 569?"8
The court referred to the controvery in The American Law Institute and
said: "We are not so much concerned about which of the opposing rules
has the actual support of a majority of the courts. Our prime concern is
which rule is the better, more workable and less confusing. We conclude
that the Restatement rule is to be preferred and adhere to it."6 The court
concluded: "It follows that the original opinion is withdrawn. The prior
decisions of this court that have held that special damages must be
proved when extrinsic facts are needed to demonstrate a defamation are
no longer to be considered authoritative. ' 70 The court reinstated the jury
verdict and entered judgment for the plaintiff. In a concurring opinion,
Judge Lusk said that the court
is fully warranted in its conclusion that the per.quod rule is an erroneous introduc-
tion into the law of libel of a rule peculiar to slander, is illogical, and is more likely
than not to lead to denials of justice. The difficulty in many cases of libel of proving
special damages is obvious and the argument that there is less danger of harm from
a writing which requires proof of extrinsic facts to show its defamatory character
than from a writing defamatory on its face, is to my mind not convincing. 7'
Every appellate court in recent years that has specifically analyzed
the libel per quod rule and considered the rule stated in the present
section 569 has rejected the per quod rule and, except for Reed v.
67. 244 Ore. 267,411 P.2d 829, rev'd, 244 Ore. 267,417 P.2d 586 (1966).
68. 244 Ore. at 272,417 P.2d at 587.
69. Id. at 277,417 P.2d at 589.
70. Id. at 279, 417 P.2d at 590.
71. Id. at 280-81. 417 P.2d at 591 (concurring opinion of Lusk, J.).
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Melnick, has accepted section 569 without any limitation on it. In Reed
v. Melnick, the court thought that in the absence of "fault" the pub-
lisher should not be liable. In so concluding, it was influenced by a New
Mexico statute that protects a visual or sound broadcaster from liability
for defamation unless it "has failed to exercise due care to prevent the
publication or utterance of such statement in such broadcast.
72
The common law of defamation, however, requires neither "fault"
nor negligence. It is within the field of strict or absolute tort liability and
the present strong tendency is to expand rather than restrict the scope
of that field. The great function of an action for defamation is to give
the innocent person, whose most precious asset-his good name-has
been injured or destroyed, an opportunity to redeem it by a public vindi-
cation. In Reed v. Melnick, the court recognized "that an injury may
be as great where the defamation is latent as where it is patent .... 73
This being so, why should the plaintiff be barred from vindicating his
good name merely because he fails to prove negligence? This requirement
will be an insuperable barrier to vindication in many cases, just as it is
when the plaintiff is required to prove special damages. 74
The innocent publisher should not be subject to punitive damages,
and, even in the absence of a retraction statute, he can voluntarily retract
and minimize the compensatory damages. This results in the prompt
public vindication that the plaintiff needs.
In the light of these factors, plus the fact that defamation law is not
"fault" law but strict liability law, there is no valid reason for the Wade
amendment or any other amendment to section 569.
72. 81 N.M. at 610, 471 P.2d at 180. These statutes generally are a result of intense lobbying
pressures by the broadcasting industry.
73. Id.
74. "This requirement of. . .special damages is a serious hurdle to a recovery in either libel
or slander actions." 81 N.M. at 610, 471 P.2d at 180.
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